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ABSTRACT
This study investigated whether the disclosure in accounting reports of information on risk and its management affects, at 
the margin, firm valuations in the Brazilian capital market. It questioned the existence of value relevance in the disclosure of 
information related to risk factors and risk management structures. The importance of the topic arises from the documentation 
that disclosure on risk factors plays a statistically significant role in valuing firms in a context marked by economic and political 
uncertainty, as is the case of the Brazilian market. The findings confirmed that information about risk shows informational 
relevance for firm valuations. Information on risk management in a firm, in turn, was not shown to be significant in 
terms of affecting company share valuations. The investigation of detailed reports with different risk factors indicated that 
individualized information shows different degrees of relevance for company valuations. It is inferred that the disclosure 
of risk factors affects the perception of investors, who also base their estimates of return on the availability and detail of 
such information. It is also observed that information on risk management structure was not shown to be value relevant; 
moreover, few firms published information on the establishment of this type of entity in their management structures. The 
residual income valuation (RIV) model (Ohlson, 1995) was applied using regressions with panel data estimation related to 
the three years covering 2012 to 2014. The sample, which was randomly delimited, was formed of 100 companies. The data 
on disclosure of risk and disclosure of risk management were collected from the companies’ Reference Forms, available from 
the website of the São Paulo Stock, Commodities, and Futures Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA). As an impact on the area of 
knowledge, broader discussions are expected regarding the utility of disclosure on the topic related to risk factors and the 
existence of a specific body responsible for risk management in firms, according to investors’ perceptions. It also contributes 
by providing evidence about the quality of disclosure related to risk (factors and management) and the perception of the 
capital market regarding the informativeness and relevance of such elements. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study examines the informational relevance 
attributed to the disclosure of information on risk factors 
associated with firms and to the reporting on the existence 
of risk management. This disclosure is expected to be 
relevant for investors, since it indicates the magnitude 
of the expected losses – possible and probable – of a 
business, and reports management efforts to mitigate their 
expected negative effects. The reporting of risks can explain 
unexpected movements in share prices, due to the market’s 
perception regarding the persistence of the earnings of 
firms that are more or less susceptible to specific risk 
factors (Jorion, 2002; Lim & Tan, 2007). The Brazilian 
market is an environment that is suitable for analysis, 
since it involves an emerging economy, characterized by 
an environment with low legal protection of investors, 
who feel vulnerable to potential expropriations (Terra & 
Lima, 2006). A report on sources of risk to the business 
and on the efforts to manage risk factors would contribute 
to the firm valuation process, enabling accurate estimates, 
reducing cost of capital, and thus attracting new investors 
and increasing the market liquidity of its securities. 
In Brazil, the disclosure of risk factors is regulated 
by Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission 
Instruction n. 480 (CVM, 2009), in the item about “risk 
factors that can influence investment decisions” to be 
reported by firms in the Reference Form. This would 
describe risk factors linked to the company itself, to the 
controller, to the shareholders, to the controlled parties, 
suppliers, and customers, to the operating sector, to the 
regulation, and to operations in foreign countries. With 
regards to the information on risk management, it is also 
imperative for the company to report on the existence of 
a specific body in the administrative structure.
The value relevance of disclosure of specific information 
has been the target of various studies, as mentioned by 
Brown, Lo, and Lys (1999). The residual income valuation 
(RIV) model provides support for valuing firms depending 
on residual incomes and other information that would 
represent relevant events not yet incorporated into the 
accounting information, but that could affect future 
earnings (Lopes, Sant’Anna & Costa, 2007; Ohlson, 
1995). Thus, using the Ohlson model (1995), the residual 
income of the subsequent period depends on the residual 
income of the previous period, which is guaranteed by the 
assumption of the linear informational dynamic (LID); the 
model therefore defines that predicting future abnormal 
income is based on this assumption and on the effects of 
this other information (Coelho & Braga, 2008).
According to Ball and Brown (1968), accounting 
incorporates various components when generating 
an information set and, as a result, net income covers 
an aggregate of these components, which are not 
homogenous. However, it is known that net income does 
not incorporate all the information capable of causing 
a change in expectations, altering the behavior of the 
decision maker (Beaver, 1968) and thus affecting the firm’s 
valuation. With the Ohlson model (1995), it is possible to 
empirically verify whether “other information” available 
in the market, not recognized by the accountants when 
calculating accounting income due to the current precepts 
in the accounting standards, is capable of altering the 
estimation of future abnormal income and, consequently, 
the value of the firm.
So, the Ohlson model (1995) is applied to evaluate 
Brazilian firms and test whether the disclosure regarding 
risk factors and management, in “other information” not 
captured in the accounting numbers, can be considered 
a relevant item for defining the price and return of firms. 
For Kimura and Pereira (2005), it is possible to accept that 
this information can prove to be critical for determining 
company value, given that the sources of uncertainty can 
affect a firm’s upcoming results, meaning practices that 
aim to manage risk and their disclosure can improve the 
estimated value of the business.
Risk management includes the disclosure of information 
on risk to reduce informational asymmetry between 
managers and investors, which would generate a more 
efficient allocation of resources between the economic 
agents in the market. For this reason, Solomon, Solomon, 
Norton, and Joseph (2000) define risk management as an 
essential practice for the maximization of shareholder 
value, based on the premise that establishing its reporting 
to the market gives businesses increased chances of success 
and supports the investment decisions of shareholders.
In his valuation model, Ohlson (1995) does not specify 
which relevant events can compose “other information”, 
but by considering them he recognizes that there is a 
set of information capable of affecting firm value that 
is not calculated by the accounting method, given that 
this information is available to the market and it can 
substantially alter investor expectations (Ball & Brown, 
1968; Beaver, 1968).
This information, which is forward-looking in 
character, is not incorporated into the accounting 
income for the period, but as it is realized, it forms part 
of the income in future periods, thus explaining residual 
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incomes. Investors are interested in company value, which 
can be understood based on the present value of future 
cash flows discounted at the risk adjusted rate. The current 
performance of a firm, reflected in its financial statements, 
should not be the only source of information for valuing 
the company (Kothari, 2001).
What would explain the existence of value relevance in 
the information on risk is the fact that there is information 
asymmetry in the market. As management has discretion 
and decides what information will be published, its release 
would affect perceptions of the relevance and quality of the 
disclosure; that is, these communications work as signalers 
of the probability of future events. Thus, it is conjectured 
that the understanding of the risk factors a company is 
subject to, and their management, would be presented 
as “other information”, including potential explanatory 
variables for the value of the firm (Chung, Judge & Li, 
2015; Edirisinghe, Gupta & Roth, 2015; Kimura & Pereira, 
2005; Solomon et al., 2000).
Based on this discussion, and considering the 
importance of studies that have examined the value 
relevance of accounting information (Kothari, 2001) 
and the propensity that sources of uncertainty that 
are amenable to disclosure have to influence investor 
decision making (Silva, Albuquerque, Marcelino & Quirós, 
2015), we have the following question: is the disclosure 
of information in accounting reports regarding risk 
factors and the existence of risk management bodies 
value relevant in the Brazilian capital market?
Based on the literature review concerning the subject 
in question, both international studies (Abraham & Cox, 
2007; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Cornaggia, 2013; Dobler, 
2008; Edirisinghe et al., 2015; Jorion, 2002; Lim & Tan, 
2007; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Moumen, Othman & 
Hussainey, 2015; Solomon et al., 2000) and Brazilian 
studies (Alves & Cherobim, 2009; Alves & Graça, 2013; 
Beuren, Dallabona & Dani, 2011; Cardoso, Mendonça & 
Riccio, 2004; Carvalho, Trapp & Chan, 2004; Cherobim & 
Alves, 2006; Fernandes, Souza & Faria, 2010; Peleias, Silva, 
Guimarães, Machado & Segreti, 2007; Zonatto & Beuren, 
2009) were found that have addressed the theme of the 
disclosure of risk and its management, mostly evaluating 
the content of the disclosure and its determinants. 
This same literature highlights that market, financial, 
corporate, strategic, technological, and environmental 
(legal, political, and economic) risks are those most often 
identified and reported by firms. Only Moumen et al. 
(2015) address the relevance of the voluntary qualitative 
reporting of risk in financial reports. For Solomon et al. 
(2000), risk management is essential for maximizing 
shareholder wealth and reducing the chances of sharp 
changes in income. The study stands out because it 
investigates the value relevance of the normative reporting 
of nine risk factors and of the existence of management 
of the sources of uncertainty. 
The aim is to support the field of study that investigates 
the value relevance of information on risk and its 
management, which are, a priori, considered critical for 
valuing firms. Few studies have considered the moderating 
intermediation channels in the relationship between risk 
and its disclosure and company value, or they suggest 
results that are not yet conclusive (Cornaggia, 2013; 
Edirisinghe et al., 2015; Kimura & Pereira, 2005; Solomon 
et al., 2000).
Besides contributing to strengthening the field of studies 
that examines the relevance of disclosure for decision 
making on value formation, this study provides evidence 
of the role played by disclosure on the management of 
sources of uncertainty as firm-distinguishing factors in 
relation to informational asymmetry. Managerially, the 
results and conclusions of the study can help managers 
with regards to reporting information that is considered 
to be critical for maximizing firm value and affecting 
investor behavior.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES
Amorin, Lima, and Murcia (2012) mention that 
accounting information represents an important useful 
variable for estimating companies’ future cash flows and 
even for evaluating their risk. These positions indirectly 
support the concept that the reporting of information in 
relation to risk can favor firm valuations, given that the 
definition of risk covers the inability to predict cash flows. 
So investors will decide to invest resources in firms based 
on expectations regarding the materialization (or risk) of 
future results that maximize their wealth (Fisher & Hall, 
1969). The studies by Jorion (2002), Lim and Tam (2007), 
and Moumen et al. (2015) show that the reporting of the 
risks associated with firms is informative and is reflected 
in their valuations.
According to Elshandidy, Fraser, and Hussainey 
(2013), the publishing of information concerning risk 
is decisive for evaluating future cash flow generation by 
a firm, because investors identify the effects of factors 
of uncertainty in the value of the company. In addition, 
with the releasing of this type of information, besides 
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reducing informational asymmetry, managers signal to 
the market their ability to identify, measure, and manage 
the risk, making it viable to capture more resources and 
for investors to more efficiently value the firm. Despite 
the above, Moumen et al. (2015) explain that even with 
the relevance given to the theme of risk disclosure, this 
field of study is still controversial as it concerns studies 
related to the disclosure strategy of firms. For the authors, 
little is known about the value relevance of the disclosure 
of information on risk, which supports the development 
of this study.
Attributing value to firms should not be based solely 
on current projections of accounting results, but also 
on flows based on “other information” related to the 
prospects for growth and future return not captured by 
the accounting. In summary, information on company 
assets are needed, besides the information described in the 
accounting statements, for adequate investment decision 
making (Lauretti, Kayo & Marçal, 2009). For Solomon 
et al. (2000), Kimura & Pereira (2005), and Silva et al. 
(2015), disclosures regarding risk and its management 
can fit this condition as they constitute relevant factors 
for estimating future cash flows.
The Ohlson model (1995) – RIV –, applied in Brazil 
by Lopes et al. (2007), Coelho and Braga (2008), Coelho, 
Aguiar, and Lopes (2011), and Madeira and Costa 
(2015), enables it to be empirically tested whether “other 
information” derived from relevant events could aggregate 
future residual incomes and thus affect the current firm 
valuation (Coelho & Braga, 2008; Lopes et al., 2007; 
Ohlson, 1995). Ohlson (1995) proposes that the value 
of the firm depends on (i) the value of net equity, (ii) 
the future residual income at present value, and (iii) the 
future cash flows derived from “other information” not yet 
captured by the accounting process due to conservatism. 
This study seeks to verify the relevance of the disclosure 
of risk and its management as a variable for carrying out 
company valuations. The Ohlson model (1995) explains the 
“other information” variable in the format of equation 1.
in which Pt is the value of the firm, yt is net equity, xta 
represents abnormal income, and vta corresponds to other 
information. As equation 1 is a linear function, the other 
terms refer to the intercept of the straight line of the 
regression and to the error term. In conformity with 
the Ohlson model (1995), abnormal income (xta) are 
estimated via equation 2.
in which it is the proxy for the risk free interest rate for 
the period, that is, the basic remuneration of the firm’s 
effort to beat the market in terms of return.
According to the LID assumption, there is a link 
between the persistence of the current accounting 
information and future residual incomes. Thus, the market 
value of a firm must be a dependent variable of expected 
abnormal future results related with “other information” 
not specified in the model (Coelho & Braga, 2008; Lopes 
et al., 2007; Ohlson, 1995). The model is also based on 
the assumptions that (i) the value of the firm is equal 
to the present value of the expected dividends; and that 
(ii) the dividends reduce the value of net equity without 
affecting current earnings (Ohlson, 1995).
The interlocution between the object of study and 
the analysis of the informational relevance leads to the 
hypothesis that the information disclosed by firms that 
report on risks and their management could have a 
favorable impact on investor decision making. With the 
disclosure, in this specific case, of information on risk and 
its management by firms, it is possible to obtain lower cost 
of capital and with this maximize the value of the firm. 
This is because the company avoids the adverse selection 
derived from the impossibility that the investor has of 
observing the adequacy of the manager’s behavior that 
aims to maximize company value. With this, there would 
be greater market efficiency concerning the allocation 
of resources between economic agents (Akerlof, 1970; 
Moumen et al., 2015; Sunder, 2014), which is what is 
expected from this study.
Risk management can be understood as part of the 
governance structure and its disclosure contributes to 
minimizing informational asymmetry between manager 
and investor, since it makes public the administration 
of crucial processes for predicting future actions in 
companies, even in the selection of measures that reduce 
or eliminate the uncertainties that can affect future cash 
flows. So, it is assumed that risk management must be 
important for the same reasons listed by Moumen et 
al. (2015) when they discussed the relevance of risk 
disclosure. Risk management refers to identifying factors 
that can cause adverse financial consequences for firms, 
but also to establishing measures that can prevent, or even 
minimize, negative effects on company value.
𝑃𝑃� =  𝛼𝛼� + 𝑦𝑦�  +  𝛼𝛼�𝑥𝑥��  +  𝛼𝛼�𝑣𝑣��  +  𝜀𝜀�  1 1
𝑥𝑥��  =  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 – 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁−1 . 𝐸𝐸𝑁𝑁  1 2
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Managers and investors know that the former hold 
information that the latter do not, and informational 
asymmetry is therefore smoothed by disclosure. In light 
of this, due to the discretion and knowing that managers 
decide on which information will be disclosed, beyond 
the regulatory and legal requirements, the disclosure 
can affect the stakeholders’ investment strategies, giving 
them bargaining power (Sunder, 2014). Complementarily, 
Bertomeu, Beyer, and Dye (2011) indicate that the 
disclosure policy determines the advantage of the 
information in the decision making, the loss related to 
the investments, and also the firms’ cost of capital. For 
Abraham and Shrives (2014), disclosure regarding risk can 
be influenced by institutional factors and by ownership 
costs, which would reduce the relevance of the disclosure.
It so happens that when a company chooses a more 
comprehensive or less restrictive disclosure policy, the 
manager must endure more monitoring from the internal 
and external parties interested in the business (Chung et 
al., 2015). In accordance with this reasoning, theoretically, 
firms with a high value would have more incentives to 
reduce informational asymmetry, besides mitigating the 
risks of adverse selection, which would avoid a discount in 
the value of the firm (Chen, Cheng, Gong & Tan, 2014). In 
summary, via their disclosure policy, managers signal to 
the market whether the firm is a “good lemon” or a “bad 
lemon” (Akerlof, 1970), minimizing adverse selection 
risks derived from informational asymmetry. In rational 
conditions, managers make good decisions or release 
“good signs” to the market because they are evaluated 
based on their decisions and on the disclosure, including 
that related to the risk factors (Dervishi & Kadriu, 2014; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013).
Kimura and Pereira (2005) argue and Miihkinen 
(2013) shows that the quality of the disclosure of risk 
and its management tends to have a negative relationship 
with informational asymmetry. However, knowing that 
the disclosure could become symbolic depending on 
managers’ behavior (Abraham & Shrives, 2014), the 
establishment of rules could increase the quality of the 
disclosure regarding risk (Miihkinen, 2012).
The relationship between disclosure and company 
valuations is supported empirically and demonstrated in 
the studies by Chen et al. (2014) and Chung et al. (2015). 
The market tends to react positively to disclosure, but it 
should be highlighted that the type of information released 
can have an differential impact on firm value (Miller, 
2002), since disclosure is composed of a broad spectrum 
of information that determines its informative value (Ball 
& Brown, 1968), and is relevant for investors as it alters 
their expectations regarding decision making (Beaver, 
1968). The design proposed in this study is coherent with 
the gap involving the near absence of studies that have 
examined the value relevance of the disclosure of risks 
and their management, which reinforces the position that 
the evidence presented is still in its infancy (Moumen et 
al., 2015).
Given the relevance of the contribution of the disclosure 
of information on risk factors and the management of risk 
factors for decision making in companies, various studies 
have been developed within this scope (Alves & Matias, 
2014; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; Silva et al., 2015). This 
study reports a summary of the findings presented by 
these investigations. In general, these studies have sought 
to characterize the reporting on risk and its management 
in companies with regards to its content (risk factors and 
management tools applied). Disclosure theory is used in 
most of the studies, directly or indirectly, to explain how 
this type of disclosure contributes to influencing decision 
making and generating value.
In the study by Solomon et al. (2000), an investigation 
was carried out regarding the direction of policies and 
practices related to risk management in investment 
funds in the United Kingdom. From the perception of 
97 managers, obtained via a survey, the authors concluded 
that almost a third of the interviewees accepted the 
relevance of the disclosure of risk to obtain greater 
accuracy when deciding on investment options. In this 
study, the contribution of risk management and disclosure 
stand out as tools of corporate governance.
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) investigated the reporting 
on risk in the annual reports of 85 non-financial firms 
listed in the “traditional market” of the Italian stock 
exchange. With the application of a proposed framework 
for analyzing the disclosure, different information was 
identified in this companies that was characterized 
based on various aspects, including: financial, corporate, 
technological, strategic, environmental (legal, political, 
economic, and others), the perspective signaled by 
the information (favorable, neutral, unfavorable), the 
measures taken, and the external orientation (decisions, 
actions, programs, and current scenario). The study also 
examined whether the size and the sector affected this 
disclosure, with no such relationships being found.
The studies by Abraham and Cox (2007) and Dobler 
(2008) were concerned with the determinants of the 
disclosure of risk. While in the study from Abraham and 
Cox (2007) evidence shows that the reporting of this 
information, in the 100 companies that make up the FTSE 
100 index, was influenced by the governance, size, sector, 
and individual risk of the firms, ownership concentration, 
double listing, and by the regulatory apparatus, Dobler 
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(2008) concludes that there are no sufficient incentives 
for the disclosure of risk by managers, which omits it, 
limiting the informative power of the companies’ reports, 
even in environments subject to regulation. The study 
from Elshandidy et al. (2013) also laid out the relationship 
between the level of risk and the disclosure of risk in 
companies in the United Kingdom, with this also being 
influenced by size, governance, and auditing, among 
other factors that are internal and external to the firm.
Jorion (2002) and Lim and Tan (2007) verified the 
relationship between the disclosure of the quantitative 
measure of the value attributed to the risk (value-at-risk – 
VAR) and the performance of financial and non-financial 
companies, respectively. Disclosure of the measure is 
obligatory and reflects the greatness of the potential loss 
derived from market risks. Jorion (2002) analyzed eight 
banks between 1995 and 1999 and concludes that the 
measure was informative and explained the variability 
of the banks’ revenues. Lim and Tan (2007) evaluated 
81 companies between 1997 and 2002 and concluded 
that high disclosed risk measures were related with low 
returns and high levels of variability in the price of shares. 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) unite the aims of the studies 
from Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) and Abraham and 
Cox (2007), as they characterize the disclosure of risk 
and examine what factors determine this reporting. In 
the annual reports of 76 firms in the United Kingdom, 
information in the categories of financial, operational, and 
strategic risk was obtained. It was concluded that there 
was a predominance of non-monetary, good, and forward-
looking information. Regarding the determinants, the 
size of the firms (bigger companies disclose more because 
their visibility and their portfolio of stakeholders are 
bigger) and the risk of the environment where they operate 
(improvement in the investor’s perception in relation 
to the intrinsic risk and to the effort of the managers in 
adequate risk management) affected this type of disclosure.
Cornaggia (2013) analyzed risk management in 
the context of North American agricultural producers. 
Evidence was obtained that risk management was 
positively related with increased productivity, especially 
when there was a combination of risk management 
and diversification among producers. The relationship 
between risk management and productivity improved 
in countries where the access to sources of funding was 
greater. For Cornaggia (2013), his work helps to clarify the 
effects of risk management in obtaining favorable results 
and accessibility to sources of funding. In this case, the 
condition of reducing the cost of capital derived from the 
actions to mitigate the risks of the business stands out.
The study from Moumen et al. (2015), which is the 
only one identified in the literature that specifically 
examines the value relevance of the disclosure of risk 
[others were highlighted, such as Jorion (2002), Lim 
and Tan (2007), Lopes et al. (2007), Coelho and Braga 
(2008), Coelho et al. (2011), Madeira and Costa (2015), 
examining the relationship between “other information” 
and the value of firms, but not for the disclosure of risk 
and its management], uses the index proposed by Linsley 
and Shrives (2006), with 32 disclosure items, applied to 
annual reports of 809 observations, between 2007 and 
2009. The authors observed that this type of disclosure is 
relevant for predicting changes in company results, and 
that this information is important for investor decision 
making. Moumen et al. (2015) claimed to have obtained 
the first evidence of the utility of the disclosure of risk 
in annual reports. 
The attention of studies in Brazil is similar to the 
proposals of the international studies, giving descriptive 
and qualitative focus to the disclosure of information 
regarding risk and its management. In the studies from 
Carvalho et al. (2004), Cherobim and Alves (2006), Peleias 
et al. (2007), and Alves and Cherobim (2009), financial 
companies are examined and it is concluded that, in 
general, (regulatory) disclosure was not satisfactory. In 
summary, it was found that the disclosure was better in 
foreign firms; the reporting on the impacts of the risk 
factors on performance was not clear and the information 
was considered insufficient to meet the informational 
demands of investors and stakeholders. The conclusion 
is consistent with the position of Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2004), who indicate this evidence as being common in 
various studies on the reporting of risk.
Fernandes et al. (2010) and Brittes, Salles-Filho, and 
Pfitzner (2015) studied the risks of the sectors and of the 
regulation, respectively, in the electrical energy sector. 
Brittes et al. (2015) found that regulatory imperatives can 
expose companies to risks that must be combated based 
on the adequacy of the management of the sources of 
uncertainty. Corroborating previous studies, Fernandes 
et al. (2010) concluded that the disclosure of risks is 
unsatisfactory for decision making, but in relation to 
public offerings of securities in the capital market.
Cardoso et al. (2004), Zonatto and Beuren (2009), 
Beuren et al. (2011), and Alves and Graça (2013) concluded 
that the disclosure regarding risk and its management 
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is not uniformized. In addition, different types of risk 
are reported by companies in financial statements 
(market, strategic, financial, and operational, among 
others). These authors also stress that various aspects 
lack discussion in the field of studies on disclosure of risk 
and its management (differences in quality of disclosure, 
influence of cultural factors, and strategies inherent to 
managers in the discretion and the relationship between 
disclosure and market efficiency).
This study differentiates itself from the others since 
studies were not observed that examined the value 
relevance of the information disclosed regarding risk 
and its management, the exception being Moumen et al. 
(2015), although they did not consider risk management 
in their analysis. The use of the Ohlson model (1995) 
is another difference, examining the role of “other 
information” in valuing Brazilian companies.
Thus, based on the theoretical framework presented 
and discussed, the disclosure of information regarding 
risk and its management, by contributing to a reduction in 
information asymmetry, would affect a company’s valuation 
in the perception of its funding agents. With the disclosure 
of attitudes involving risk management, a proposal for 
mitigating uncertainty and a commitment to maximizing 
company value are signaled to the market. This practice, 
in theory, would mean the company took advantage of 
market opportunities not accessible to competitors, leading 
it to the obtainment of competitive advantages. It is also 
argued that the disclosure of risks and of the measures for 
their management enable the investor to more accurately 
identify the impacts that revealed risk factors can have on 
future cash flows and on company valuation.
Thus, considering the informative capacity of the 
disclosure in financial statements regarding risk and 
risk management in “other information” for pricing assets 
(Amorin et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2014; Chung et al., 2015; 
Cornaggia, 2013; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Fernandes et al., 
2010; Kimura & Pereira, 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; 
Moumen et al., 2015; Ohlson, 1995; Solomon et al., 2000; 
Silva et al., 2015), the following hypotheses are raised:
H1: the disclosure of risk factors associated with the business 
of a firm is value relevant in the perception of investors in the 
company valuation process in a statistically significant way;
H2: disclosure regarding the existence of a specific body for 
risk management in firms is value relevant in the perception 
of investors in the company valuation process in a statistically 
significant way.
In relation to hypothesis H1, a higher level of disclosure 
of risk factors is expected to lead investors to improve their 
firm valuations. It is assumed that investors choose to invest 
resources based on a broad set of information that help 
in estimating future cash flows, instead to deciding with 
a lower level of disclosure or no reported information. In 
relation to hypothesis H2, information about the existence 
of a body in the administrative structure engaged in risk 
management is expected to signal greater confidence about 
the continuity of a business and about the relevance of 
disclosing risk factors. The non-rejection of the hypotheses 
would imply that the accounting data in themselves do 
not explain the whole company valuation process; the 
existence of other information would alter the valuation, 
assuming the assumption of the LID, included in the 
Ohlson model (1995).
3. METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES
The population of the study was made up of the 508 
firms listed on the São Paulo Stock, Commodities, and 
Futures Exchange (BM&FBOVESPA) on the date of the 
data collection (November 27th of 2015). Based on a finite 
population, the sample size (n) was calculated considering 
a 95% confidence level, sample size maximization, and a 
5% sampling error. This resulted in an estimated sample 
of 219 randomly selected firms. Of these, companies were 
excluded that (i) had no market value available in the 
Economatica® database; (ii) had no accessible financial 
statements in the BM&FBOVESPA; (iii) presented 
negative net equity, all this referring to the analysis period 
(2012-2014). After the exclusions, 100 companies (300 
firm-year observations) remained; to process the test 
model and other statistics, the share with the highest 
trading liquidity, according to Economatica®, was selected.
Regarding the period referred to, its relevance stands 
out due it covering part of the time horizon marked by 
the economic recession in Brazil, starting in 2009 and 
worsening in 2015 (Martins & Paulo, 2016). This is because 
with the integration between the markets economic 
environments characterized like this could interfere with 
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the disclosure and information asymmetry, affecting 
the pricing of the firms’ assets via investor perception 
(Bergmann, Securato, Savoia & Contani, 2015; Martins 
& Paulo, 2016). 
To test the hypothesis that information regarding 
risk and its management may not be fully contemplated 
in earnings, but may be reflected in future results, the 
Ohlson model (1995) was used, as shown in equation 3.
in which Pt is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
the firms (see Economatica®), NEt is the natural logarithm 
of net equity (see financial statements), AIt is the abnormal 
income calculated in accordance with equation 2, scaled 
by NEt-1, with the proxy for the risk free interest rate 
being the Special Settlement and Custody System (Selic) 
suggested by Lopes et al. (2007) and applied in Madeira 
and Costa (2015), RiskInft is the index of the volume of 
disclosure of risk factors, and RiskMant is the disclosure of 
the existence of a risk management entity, with a dummy 
with 1 for its existence and 0 otherwise.
The disclosure regarding risk factors was observed 
based on the “risk factors that can influence investment 
decisions” reported by the firms in the Reference Forms, 
in accordance with CVM Instruction n. 480  (CVM, 2009). 
This instruction requires the companies to disclose risk 
factors linked to (i) issuer; (ii) controller; (iii) shareholders; 
(iv) controlled parties; (v) suppliers; (vi) customers; (vii) 
sectors; (viii) regulation; and (ix) operations in foreign 
countries, described in Item 4.1 of the Reference Form 
– Description – Risk Factors.
The measurement of the variable was carried out in 
the following way: carrying out the firm characterization 
of the risk factors in the Reference Form, or if there was 
detail on the reason the information had been omitted, 
one of nine possible scores was attributed to each risk 
factor, and 0 otherwise. For the purposes of including 
equation 3 in the model, the mean of the company score 
was chosen, considering the nine factors, with 0 being the 
minimum score and 1 being the maximum, thus creating 
an “index” for the disclosure of risk factors. 
In addition, an individualized value relevance analysis 
was chosen for each one of the nine risk factors, with the 
RiskInft variable being transformed into nine dummies, 
with 1 for disclosure of the factor and 0 otherwise. The 
analysis is warranted because even with theoretical and 
empirical evidence of the impact of disclosure on the 
company valuation process (Chen et al., 2014; Chung 
et al., 2015), there are still caveats, given that the type of 
information reported could define the direction of this 
relationship (Miller, 2002). Accepting this prerogative, 
concerning the disclosure regarding risk, is not only 
prudent as different “categories” of this type of disclosure 
are referred to in the studies from Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2004), Cardoso et al. (2004), Linsley and Shrives (2006), 
Zonatto and Beuren (2009), Beuren et al. (2011), and 
Alves and Graça (2013).
As for the disclosure regarding the risk management 
in a firm, this was observed in the companies’ Reference 
Forms, in Item 12.1 – Administrative Structure, in which 
the composition of the administration and the bodies that 
help in the management are described. The established 
structure with the responsibility for managing risks 
related to the business was sought. When there was risk 
management, 1 was attributed, and 0 otherwise.
The informational relevance was verified via the 
coefficients of the variables for disclosure of risk and 
risk management when statistically significant. All the 
financial data needed for the development of the study 
were collected from the standardized financial statements 
of the companies available from the BM&FBOVESPA 
website. The estimation of model 3 was carried out with 
a panel data regression, adopting the modality indicated 
by the Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests applied for each 
process; robust modeling was also used. The data were 
“winsorized” by applying the observations contained 
at the extremities of the distribution, covering 5% in 
each tail related to the continuous variables. It should be 
mentioned that this procedure increased the consistency 
of the coefficients of the model, especially in relation to 
the abnormal return.
𝑃𝑃� =  𝛼𝛼� + 𝛼𝛼�𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁�  + 𝛼𝛼�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�  + 𝛼𝛼�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅�  + 𝛼𝛼�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅�  + 𝜀𝜀� 1 3
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4. RESULTS
4.1 Effects of Disclosure about Risk and its Management on Firm Value
Before the analysis of the relevance itself, Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables considered in 
the value relevance model.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the research
Note: the variables are described in the text.
Source: elaborated by the authors.
Based on Table 1, it is perceived that the means for 
the value of the companies and the abnormal income 
reduced in the period, perhaps due to the effects of the 
economic recession and low optimism in the market. In 
contrast, the average net equity increased. The disclosure 
of risk factors was shown to be satisfactory in the 
sample. Regarding risk management, 71 observations 
had information about the existence of this specific 
administrative body in the firms, representing 24% of 
the total. The firms with risk management have better 
results for the disclosure of risk factors (mean: 0.9390 
against 0.8957; amplitude: 0.4444 against 1.000; standard 
deviation: 0.1185 against 0.2307), which may signal 
the impact of risk management on disclosure. As a 
dichotomous variable is concerned, risk management 
was not included in the descriptive analysis.
The results indicated in Table 2 reproduce the 
processing of four formulations of equation 3 and 
signal that there are different degrees of relevance of 
the accounting information and of the disclosure of 
information about risk factors and their management 
in the firm valuation process in the Brazilian stock market.
Descriptive statistics Period Pt NEt AIt RiskInft
Mean
2012 14.2659 13.8864 0.0131 0.9033
2013 14.2373 13.9211 0.0011 0.9033
2014 14.0206 13.9482 -0.0460 0.9111
2012-2014 14.1746 13.9186 -0.0106 0.9059
Standard deviation
2012 1.9013 1.8441 0.2416 0.2117
2013 1.9042 1.8825 0.2269 0.2146
2014 2.0463 1.9543 0.2068 0.2065
2012-2014 1.9483 1.8880 0.2263 0.2103
Minimum
2012 10.7699 7.6643 -0.7712 0.0000
2013 10.8366 7.8095 -0.8320 0.0000
2014 10.3835 7.6653 -1.0523 0.0000
2012-2014 10.3835 7.6643 -1.0523 0.0000
Maximum
2012 19.3562 19.6169 1.3739 1.0000
2013 19.1847 19.6715 0.7913 1.0000
2014 19.0253 19.5544 0.6795 1.0000
2012-2014 19.3562 19.6715 1.3739 1.0000
Median
2012 14.2958 13.9345 0.0056 1.0000
2013 14.2355 13.9960 0.0142 1.0000
2014 13.7637 14.0602 -0.0311 1.0000
2012-2014 14.1542 14.0068 -0.0071 1.0000
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Table 2
Value relevance and disclosure of risk
a = residual income valuation (RIV); b = risk factors; c = risk management; d = complete formulation.
* = R2 for estimation with fixed effects is 0.1374 and 0.1887, althought the Chow, Breusch-Pagan, and Hausman tests lead to its 
rejection; *** = 1% level of significance.
Source: elaborated by the authors.
The first column confirms the proposal from Ohlson 
(1995) that abnormal income are relevant for explaining 
investors’ and shareholders’ company valuations; 
moreover, the assumption of the model is fulfilled, 
since the coefficient related to income is positive and 
lower than 1; that is, the accounting aggregates have 
informational value and net equity and residual incomes 
show significance.
On the other hand, it is perceived that introducing the 
variables related to other information, despite raising the 
coefficient of determination of the regressions, disrupts 
the way the coefficients are interpreted, especially with 
regards to the processes in columns c and d, given that 
in these cases there is significance regarding the variables 
representative of any dimension of risk, leading the 
coefficients concerning abnormal income to violate the 
assumptions of RIV.
However, the disclosure regarding the set of different 
risk factors would be contributing to the firm share pricing 
process, with this not being observed with respect to 
the information about the body for managing the risk 
factors. So, in the case of column b the information on 
risk is significant and consistent with the value relevance 
process; in truth, due to its negative nature, the weight of 
the abnormal income is softened in the valuation.
This result corroborates the positions derived from 
the discussion or from the empirical verification in the 
studies from Solomon et al. (2000), Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2004), Linsley and Shrives (2006), Alves and Matias 
(2014), Moumen et al. (2015), and Silva et al. (2015). All 
argue that disclosure regarding risk is prioritized in the 
firm valuation process.
However, it should be noted that none of the studies 
mentioned studied the context of the Brazilian stock 
market, which leads to questions about the utility and 
quality of this type of disclosure. In addition, the studies 
mentioned consider the information regarding risk, when 
reported, to be an element that helps in valuations. 
In studies that have segregated the economic sector, 
such as Carvalho et al. (2004), Cherobim and Alves (2006), 
Peleias et al. (2007), Alves and Cherobim (2009), and 
Fernandes et al. (2010), the evidence of relevance of the 
disclosure of risk is not corroborated. All investigated 
regulated segments, the financial one, and the electrical 
energy one, concluding that the reporting of risk was not 
satisfactory and marked by low quality and little relevance.
It is prudent to mention that the rate of disclosure of 
risk factors is high, with most of the companies disclosing 
with regards to risk in accentuated volumes. However, it 
was perceived that the informational content present in the 
firms’ reports practically did not vary in the three years of 
analysis, removing the variability in the perception of the 
investors and perhaps explaining the negative relationship, 
contrary to expectations. The firms in Brazil, as practice, 
repeat the reporting of sources of risk, which does not 
guarantee an adequate evaluation of the securities.
The disclosure regarding risk management presented a 
coefficient that was statistically equal to 0, which indicates 
the inexistence of informational relevance of this type of 
reporting in the Brazilian stock market. This evidence 
goes against Solomon et al. (2000), Fernandes et al. 
(2010), and Cornaggia (2013), who study or discuss the 
contribution, even if potential, of risk management as a 
corporate governance tool for firms. 
𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕 =  𝜶𝜶𝟎𝟎 + 𝜶𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕 + 𝜶𝜶𝟐𝟐𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕 + 𝜶𝜶𝟑𝟑𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑨𝑨𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒕𝒕 + 𝜶𝜶𝟒𝟒𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒕𝒕 + 𝜺𝜺𝒕𝒕 1 
Parâmetros a b c d
𝛼𝛼� 1 9.73*** 9.90*** 2.23*** 2.60***
𝛼𝛼� 1 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.86*** 0.87***
𝛼𝛼� 1 0.99*** 1.06*** 1.36*** 1.40***
𝛼𝛼� 1 - -0.72*** - -0.56
𝛼𝛼� 1 - - 0.08 0.10
F statistic 9.91*** 11.96*** 256.15*** 275.09***
R2 0.1263 0.1623 0.7847* 0.7798*
Estimation Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Random effects
Observations (n) 300 300 300 300
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Other studies could investigate how the establishment 
of this body in the administrative structure acts in solving 
agency conflicts and in increasing accuracy in the investor 
decision-making process in the Brazilian setting, which 
was not addressed in this study. What is expected from 
risk management is the ability to identify and mitigate 
elements capable of maximizing negative effects on firm 
equity. Despite the prerogative, risk management as 
reported information was not shown to be informative. 
The finding may raise questions about the contribution 
of the Brazilian institutional environment with regards 
to the value relevance of the accounting aggregates. For 
this, other studies could consider this aspect. Assuming 
that certain characteristics of the economic hypothesis 
can be generators of differences in perception and utility 
of the disclosure (Bergmann et al., 2015; Lopes et al., 
2007; Martins & Paulo, 2016), the Brazilian stock market 
may not attribute relevance to the information on risk 
management established due to inefficiencies in this 
market.
Only 24% of the observations refer to the existence of 
risk management established as a management assisting 
entity. In these conditions, there would be reasons to 
believe that risk management would not be capable of 
affecting the value of the business. It is noted that the 
establishment of risk management is not obligatory. Even 
considering its importance, as according to the portion 
of studies provided here, information about the existence 
of risk management did not prove to be relevant within 
the context of valuing firms.
Results alluding to the informational relevance of each 
risk factor were also highlighted, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Value relevance of the disclosure of risk factors
Notes: n = 300; estimation of the models by fixed effects; factor 1 (issuer), factor (controller), factor 3 (shareholders), factor 4 
(controlled parties), factor 5 (suppliers), factor 6 (customers), factor 7 (sectors), factor 8 (regulation), factor 9 (operations in 
foreign countries). a = the results of the F estimation are absent in the model with the insertion of the White matrix, but significant 
to 1% when there is not insertion. 
***, **, * = 1, 5, and 10% significance, respectively; 
Source: elaborated by the authors.
It is perceived that the disclosure of each risk factor 
is also significant and relevant for the valuation process. 
More than 97% of the observations reported risks related 
to the issuer (factor 1), which may explain the absence of 
the F statistic in this robust model. In this field, the firms 
indicated aspects of indebtedness, strategic definition, 
relationship with economic agents, operational capacity, 
corruption, competition, maintaining their human capital, 
and infrastructure.
Factors 2, 7, and 8 (controller, sector, and regulation) 
stand out with the greatest value relevance. Information 
on risks related to the shareholders and to the controlled 
parties, represented by factors 3 and 4, has lower 
informative value for pricing. Thus, it is shown that 
the different types of risk generate different expectations 
in the valuation, suggesting that the type of risk may 
be a determinant for the attribution of value and for 
decision making. This supports the studies by Miller 
(2002), Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Cardoso et al. 
(2004), Linsley and Shrives (2006), Zonatto and Beuren 
(2009), Fernandes et al. (2010), Beuren et al. (2011), 
Alves and Graça (2013), and Brittes et al. (2015). These 
studies suggest that the type of disclosure about risk has 
informative value.
𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕 =  𝜶𝜶𝟎𝟎 + 𝜶𝜶𝟏𝟏𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵𝒕𝒕 + 𝜶𝜶𝟐𝟐𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝒕𝒕 + 𝜶𝜶𝟑𝟑𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹 𝑨𝑨𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒕𝒕 + 𝛆𝛆𝐭𝐭 1 
Factors 𝜶𝜶𝟎𝟎 1 𝜶𝜶𝟏𝟏 1 𝜶𝜶𝟐𝟐 1 𝜶𝜶𝟑𝟑 1 F statistic R2
1 9.96*** 0.38*** 0.99*** -1.06*** Absenta 0.1592
2 9.83*** 0.35*** 1.00*** -0.64** 9.42*** 0.1509
3 9.88*** 0.33*** 1.04*** -0.28* 10.43*** 0.1427
4 9.90*** 0.33*** 1.06*** -0.30** 10.76*** 0.1458
5 9.70*** 0.36*** 1.09*** -0.56** 11.31*** 0.1641
6 9.73*** 0.35*** 1.06*** -0.48** 10.86*** 0.1539
7 9.85*** 0.35*** 1.00*** -0.63** 9.42*** 0.1509
8 9.83*** 0.35*** 1.00*** -0.63** 9.42*** 0.1509
9 9.83*** 0.33*** 1.01*** -0.30* 9.65*** 0.1428
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4.2 Discussion
The findings reinforced the idea that investors not only 
lack, but use supplementary information to that disclosed 
by accounting statements (Lauretti et al., 2009) when 
pricing securities, confirming the contribution of the RIV 
model proposed by Ohlson (1995). The identification of 
evidence that suggests the utility of disclosure associated 
with the risk factors related to a business leads it to be 
believed that the Brazilian capital market evaluates the 
broad spectrum of available information, choosing the 
elements that have informational relevance and are 
therefore capable of altering decision-making expectations 
(Ball & Brown, 1968; Beaver, 1968).
In contrast, it can be verified that the type of disclosure 
(Miller, 2002), besides its nature or purpose, denotes 
different interpretations by investors. This aspect is 
raised as it should be remembered that inferences 
about value relevance are essentially different in the 
comparisons of information about risk factors and about 
their management. While the latter did not indicate 
informational relevance, the volume of information about 
risk factors, as well as the type of reporting related to risk, 
indicated value relevance.
The benefit of reducing asymmetry should be evaluated 
with care according to the type of information reported, 
which is what the results presented demonstrate. Managers 
signal to investors their ability to identify, measure, and 
manage risk with this information. With this, giving 
them bargaining power (Sunder, 2014), they determine 
the advantage of this information in decision making 
(Bertomeu et al., 2011). In this study, it is indicated that if 
the reduction in asymmetry involves the reporting of risk, 
the firm valuation tends to be lower in the market. This 
could come about because the investor is pessimistic and 
chooses to anticipate the risks in the valuation, thus not 
overvaluing the business. Another reason would be the 
invariability observed in the disclosure of the risk factors 
and the null value relevance of the risk management.
Lopes et al. (2007), Abraham and Shrives (2014), 
Bergmann et al. (2015), and Martins and Paulo (2016) 
stress that the institutional environment, besides firm 
characteristics, such as ownership costs, can interfere 
in the relevance of the disclosure. The disclosure of 
risk factors is shown to be a value reducer, leading the 
market to demand a higher premium for these firms’ 
securities. A reasonable explanation is derived from the 
characteristics of the Brazilian market: credit-based, 
a strong link between tax and accounting aspects, 
government influence in the establishment of rules 
(mitigated due to the accounting convergence with the 
international standards), and influence of Roman law 
in the elaboration of the legislation (Lopes et al., 2007). 
These factors reign over the accounting, the informational 
relevance, and the disclosure, and perhaps explain why 
risk management, which is present in very few firms, has 
an inexistent reflection on value.
The evidence provided corroborates the affirmation 
that the accounting information represents an important 
useful variable for estimating companies’ future cash flows 
(Amorin et al., 2012) and converges with the concept that 
investors make their decisions to invest resources in firms 
based on expectations about the materialization of future 
results (Fisher & Hall, 1969), according to disclosure 
theory. Firms, represented by their management, need to 
send out “good signs” to the market. Thus, the disclosure 
of risk factors represents this “good sign”, in comparison 
with the absence of disclosure (Akerlof, 1970; Dervishi 
& Kadriu, 2014; Elshandidy et al., 2013), given that they 
contribute to the formation of company value.
5. CONCLUSION
The study has achieved its objective, by showing the 
impact of information on risk factors and on the existence 
of a risk management body, revealed in accounting 
statements for the company valuation process in Brazil, 
in the perception of investors. It was concluded that the 
type of disclosure studied interferes in the attribution of 
value to a business, which suggests that other information, 
not recognized in the accounting process for valuing 
firms, in this case associated with information about risk 
factors and about risk management bodies, interferes in 
the valuation process in the capital market, in addition 
to the strictly accounting valuation.
Of the hypotheses raised, the one that suggests 
the relevance of the reporting corresponding to the 
informational volume about risk factors in the process 
of valuing securities, is not rejected. It was also found 
that, individually, the information on risk factors is 
relevant for valuing firms to different degrees. As for the 
hypothesis that suggests value relevance of information 
alluding to risk management bodies, this was rejected. 
The results indicated that the disclosure of risk factors 
moderates the overvaluation of company shares and that 
the information on the establishment of a specific body for 
risk management is not taken into account by investors 
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for pricing securities. Thus, alternatives could be explored 
in other studies in the future, such as the interactive 
effect between the disclosure of risk factors and a risk 
management body and the accounting numbers, thus 
helping to explain the relevance of the purely accounting 
predictors. 
This study has provided aspects that add to the field of 
investigation on disclosure, more specifically regarding 
the evidence associated with the risk factors considered by 
companies in their businesses. The multiplicity of variables 
described in the reports as a source of possible financially 
adverse effects, such as competition, political instability, 
global economic situation, technological development, 
and scarcity of resources, suggests the complexity inherent 
to the asset pricing process, assuming subjectivity and 
discretion on the part of the agents.
This could be fertile ground for studies interested in 
qualifying the risk factors in specific markets, helping 
to understand the reasons for which the disclosure 
regarding risk factors affects the company valuation 
process in Brazil, while the information concerning 
risk management bodies was not shown to be relevant. 
Managerially, the research could incentivize managers in 
the elaboration of reports containing greater informative 
quality, given that various companies were observed that, 
in general, repeated the information that characterized 
the risks to their business in the three years studied. In 
summary, the investor tends to reduce the value of the 
firm or judge the disclosure to be irrelevant, since it is 
invariable in the period.
The immutability of the disclosure of risk factors calls 
into question the effective actuation of management with 
regards to evaluating a business’ risk factors, reliably 
portraying them in the reports. The other side of the 
coin is to assume in advance the inefficiency of the risk 
management, since if the disclosure does not change, it is 
unlikely that the sources of uncertainty for the business 
have remained constant over the three years studied. Thus, 
the market may understand that the disclosure would 
only reflect the raising of costs and the management’s 
administrative and monitoring inefficiency, helping to 
explain the value relevance obtained in this study. In the 
brief descriptive analysis, it was possible to note that the 
reporting is a little better (on average) in those companies 
with an established risk management body, despite the 
low adherence to the establishment of this governance 
mechanism.
The research contributes to investigating how the 
disclosure practiced, the risk perceived, and the value of 
the firm may be related in the Brazilian market. Supports 
are given to question the processes of attributing value 
and decision making based on the disclosure of sources 
of uncertainty and their management in companies. This 
helps managers and investors with regards to the reporting 
and identification of information considered critical for 
maximizing company value.
This study is limited and understanding these 
restrictions is important for a better evaluation of the 
results explained. The following can be mentioned:
a. The measurement of the variables associated with 
risk (factors and management) covered only the 
verification of the existence of the information and 
did not investigate in depth the content related to the 
disclosure. This evidence, if explored, could contribute 
to the suggested analysis;
b. The econometric models constitute a short panel and 
can generate large differences between the estimators 
of the approaches with fixed and random effects. Thus, 
studies could be carried out that explored greater 
time horizons;
c. Even with the comprehensive and random initial 
sampling delimitation, restrictive factors inherent to 
the data collection stage reigned over the determination 
of the final sample. In this sense, raising the number 
of observations could give robustness to the results 
reached;
d. It should be remembered that any generalizations of 
these results and conclusions need to consider the 
constant characteristics in the methodological center 
of the study, given that they are conditioned to the 
approach followed in this research. New investigations 
could provide other perspectives when they extrapolate 
the limitations described.
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